Abstract. We propose a detection mechanism that takes the advantage of virtualized environment and combines both passive and active detection approaches for detecting bot malware. Our proposed passive detection agent lies in the virtual machine monitor to profile the bot behavior and check against it with other hosts. The proposed active detection agent that performs active bot fingerprinting can send specific stimulus to a host and examine if there exists expected triggered behavior. In our experiments, our system can distinguish bots and the benign process with low false alarm. The active fingerprinting technique can detect a bot even when a bot does not do its malicious jobs.
Introduction
Generally, bot behavior can be divided into two categories: network activity and host activity. Correspondingly, there are two types of intrusion detection systems (IDS): network-based and host-based IDS. The former one targets on bot's network activities observed from the network; while the latter one focuses on the information collected directly from the host. They target on the following entities to detect malware: files, Windows registries, DLLs and networks.
One limitation of both detectors is their passivity. We can only detect bots after observing particular bot activities. Another issue is that bot may change it behavior if it detects a detector. In order to overcome the above issues, we propose a detection mechanism that takes the advantage of virtualized environment with combining both passive and active approaches.
The proposed Passive Detection Agent lies in the virtual machine monitor to examine and track the tainted data used by a suspicious host and check it against the bot behavior profile. It provides a transparency to the monitored host. Moreover, it can monitor multiple guest hosts simultaneously. The proposed Active Detection Agent that performs active bot fingerprinting can send specific stimulus (derived from the bot behavior profile) to a host and examine if it is a bot by observing whether certain expected behavior is triggered by the stimulus. Our experiment shows it can diminish the problem of passivity and is a good tool to evaluate a host without installing additional detection agents.
Related Work
Botnet Detection. BotHunter [2] constructs a botnet infection dialog model and uses it to detect the intrusion activities. BotSniffer [3] detects bots within the same botnet based on their spatial-temporal correlation and similarity. BotMiner [4] performs cross cluster correlation to identify the host that shares similar behavior patterns. Panorama [6] traces the information flow of predefined taint data in the host, and observes how and when a malware process leverages them. While BotTracer [5] detects malicious behavior by observing the process with the help of virtual machine technique, API hooking and network monitoring tool.
Virtual Machine Introspection. Garnkel [10] proposed a detection architecture using VM introspection (VMI). They provide six security policies and monitor them with a modified VMware Workstation. ReVirt [11] targets on moving security logging mechanism into a VM. Chen et al. [12] stated that secure logging and intrusion detection could benefit from the virtualized environment. A formal model [13] of VMI is even proposed for describing VMI techniques.
Fingerprinting. OS fingerprinting was developed by using the different configurations of each OS's TCP protocol implementation to detect the OS version of a remote host. Today, fingerprinting technology has been widely used in OS Fingerprinting, application fingerprinting and vulnerability fingerprinting. In this paper, we adopt the concept of fingerprinting and introduce a profiling system in the virtualized layer for bot fingerprinting.
Monitor and Detection Approach

Monitor the Guest OS in a Virtualized Environment
We implement the detection agents in the visualization layer to monitor the guest behavior through the VMM so that we can monitor it without modifying the guest OS or installing additional software, and reduce the risk of being detected by the malware. In addition, the detection agents can monitor all above guest OSes at the same time without affecting the guest OS performance. However, such virtual machine introspection (VMI) approach must consider the semantic gap between the OS-level semantics and low-level virtual machine observations.
Learning-Based Bot Behavior Profile
The initial bot process may create other processes to perform malicious activities. Our goal is to trace all these bot processes' behavior and generate a bot behavior profile. We adopt a learning approach to generate the profile from real world bot samples. In our observation, usually a bot needs to access or modify specific files or Windows registries to run the bot. Hence, we build the bot's behavior profile by using the file/registry access activities of the bot processes.
We define an activity as a system API call related to a file/registry access. The proposed PDA will generate a bot process activity log that contains the activities of the processes of a bot variant. Based on a set of collected activity logs of a bot family, we then generate a bot behavior profile that contains the common activities from each activity logs. Then, we collect the bot behavior profile of different bot families to build a bot (malware) behavior database.
Passive Bot Detection
Based on the database, we identify a set of files/registries subject to monitor and mark them tainted, and then the PDA checks unknown processes against the tainted objects in the runtime. If any process accesses the tainted objects, it is marked suspicious. Then immediately, the PDA starts to trace the activities of this process and generates the corresponding activity log.
The PDA then analyzes the collected activity log against the bot behavior profile database to determine the abnormality. We calculate the Jaccard similarity coefficient between a bot behavior profile and the activity log to measure the similarity of them. The Jaccard value for file, α J (i, k), and for registry, β J (i, k) are computed for a possible bot k in guest host i based on the process activity log L i and the bot behavior profile L k .
If both values are 1.0, it implies the guest i has exactly the same behavior with bot k. Proper thresholds α k and β k should be set for effective detection. Hence, if α(i, k) ≥ α k and β(i, k) ≥ β k , we say the host i is infected by bot k.
Active Bot Fingerprinting
We observe a bot has certain hidden behavior only when it is properly triggered [7] . We derive such active fingerprinting from the bot behavior profile as follows.
1. We list the I/O-related activities invoked by the bot process in terms of API calls with the input parameters and output results. 2. Construct the bot dataflow digraph where a vertex is an API call and a directed edge from vertex u to vertex v indicates the relationship that an output value of u is passed to v as an input parameter. 3. From 2), generate a fingerprint that contains stimulus and response in pair.
The stimulus is set to the API call u and the response is set to the API call v. If we change the value, theoretically it will be passed to v. 4. From 3), we perform the active bot fingerprinting through the stimulus (i.e., u), and then observe if v is triggered. In our experiments, a stimulus is most likely a file change, a registry change or network packet received. 
System Design and Implementation
Our system (Fig. 1) consists of Passive Detection Agent (PDA) and Active Detection Agent (ADA) that are implemented as VMM plugins. PDA Process Tracing Module. Before tracing a process, PDA acquires the process information of the guest OS sent by the PDA driver. It includes process name, PID, CR3 value and the loaded modules. In Fig. 2 , the module gets the current CR3 value (step 1) of the current process. If the target process (specified by CR3, PID or process name) is executing (step 2), the current status of CPU (step 3) and memory (step 4) are retrieved for further inspection. Further, we call the API hooking module (step 5) to record the process behavior.
PDA API Hooking Module. API hooking [1] modifies the API address in the DLL file to a self-defined function for call interception. Our API hooking is stealthier by obtaining the call information through the virtual hardware. We monitor the EIP register to check if target API is called (step 6) and invoke the callback function (step 7). We obtain the inputs and outputs of the API from memory (step 8-9) and the EAX register (step 10-11). Three types of API are hooked: (1) File: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, CopyFile; (2) Registry: RegOpenKeyEx, RegQueryValueEx, RegSetValueEx, RegCreateKeyEx, Active Detection Agent (ADA). ADA contains a fingerprint generator and an examiner. Generator generates bot fingerprinting, and the examiner instructs the ADA driver to initiate the stimulus of a fingerprint and checks if the expected response is triggered. It can be performed periodically to check the bot infection situation, even when a bot is in its incubation period.
The PDA and ADA implementation (Fig. 1 ) is based on TEMU [8] , a dynamic taint tracing platform built upon QEMU [9] . Xerces-c is used to generate and parse XML-based behavior profile. The host OS is Ubuntu 10.10, TEMU 1.0 is used with kqemu 1.3.0pre11, and the guest OS is Windows XP SP3. We also implement new features in TEMU including a multi-process tracing mechanism, parameters retrieval function for Windows API, and an event logging subsystem.
Experiment
The bot samples are provided the National Center for High-Performance Computing, Taiwan. We choose four families of botnet: Virut, Sality, Korgo and Pinfi. For each family, we have 10 variants that are the largest in the database. We also use Windows Internet Explorer (IE) as an example of benign process.
Learning-based Bot Behavior Profiling
We infect vulnerable guest OS with bot samples and instruct the PDA to record the bot-related activities for 2 minutes. For generating the behavior profile for a bot family, we extract the common entries form the activity logs of the variants of this family. We expect that different bot families should have certain distinct behavior. Table 1 shows the number of file/registry accessed in our samples.
LoadLibrary. LoadLibrary loads specified module into the address space of the calling process. There are total 22 common libraries for all bot families. Pinfi loads a library (cja1.tmp) from a temporary folder, which is abnormal.
Process-Related APIs. It is quite common to spawn new processes. However, IE only duplicates itself IEXPLORER.EXE. Korgo uses WinExec to execute %system32%\zaegr.exe. Alternatively, Virut uses OpenProcess to invoke rundll32.exe. CopyFile and DeleteFile. All bots use CopyFile to make a copy of the bot binary to system or temporary folder. The filename looks like zaegr.exe or vwjop.exe. Sality deletes several temporary files that are created by itself, when IE only deletes HTTP cookies and HTML files in IE's temporary folder.
CreateFile. This API has a parameter creationDisposition, and it could be CREATE NEW, CREATE ALWAYS or OPEN EXISTING. The bot samples use the first two values to create files in the system folder and use the last one to read/execute file, when IE uses OPEN EXISTING for reading cookies, HTML and font files.
RegCreateKey and RegSetValue. Bot may modify registry to change the host behavior, such as adding services (all bots), change hostname/domain (Korgo), change firewall settings (Sality), or disable User Account (Sality).
Files and Registries. Table 2 shows the average Jaccard similarity coefficient and its standard deviation between every bot variants within its family, as well as the coefficient comparing with IE. As expected, the similarity within the bot family is higher than IE. From the viewpoint of registry, Sality variants have common behavior (.3979), but the variance (.1910 ) is large as well.
We observe (1) the number of file is small, which suggests detecting file is important but may have high false positive; (2) variants may use random filenames; (3) variants usually do not use random registry name; (4) bot variants in the same family have common activities which indicates using known bots may detect new variants; (5) IE is very different from others.
Passive Bot Detection
We randomly selection four of variants (out of ten) to generate the bot behavior profile, and use it to test the rest variants. Each test runs 20 times with different random selections. Take Sality for example; on the average, the behavior profile has 1.5 files and 447.65 registries; while Virut's profile has 5 files and 129.55 registries. We then calculate the Jaccard value for each testing variants and IE.
Due to the page limit, we only use k = Virut as an example, the average α J (V i , k) = 0.2981 and α J (IE, k) = 0.0378, so that the α difference is 0.2603. The average β J (V i , k) = 0.3307 and β J (IE, k) = 0.0925, hence the β difference is 0.2382. The larger difference means we can more easily to distinguish a benign process and a bot process. For all bot families, the minimal difference for α J is 0.0498 and for β J is 0.1127. They are used as thresholds in our experiment.
Active Bot Detection
We generated an active fingerprinting for Virut for example. The stimulus is to set the value of registry Domain and Hostname in HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\System\ CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters. The former one is usually NULL, while the latter one is the host name. The response is a DNS query with a domain name combining the value of two registries. We test this fingerprinting on all the Virut variants and all variants access these two registries and send the DNS packet out, except one accesses them but does not send the DNS packet.
Conclusion
We propose a passive process activity analysis and active fingerprinting methods for bot detection in virtualized environments. Our system has the following benefits. (1) These methods are less intrusive than traditional host-based approach. 
